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THE SO回CALLEDTOCHI-KOI (ACTE DE 
GOUVERNEMENT) AND THE 
CONSTITUTION OF OUR COUNTRY 
By T ATSUGORO ISOZAKI 
Professor of Laω， Osaka University 
I 
1 understand that Prof. Toshiyoshi Miyazawa is the first to intro-
duce the so-called Tochi-koi (acte de gouvernement) to our country. 
He gave out his essays entitled "Administrative adjudication and Tochi-
sayo (function of government)" in "Commemoration Essays <tThe 
problems on the Constitution and the Administrative Law~ for the 
sixtieth anniversary of Dr. Soichi Sasaki's birth " pp. 167 et seq. and “Acte 
de gouvernement in the case law of France" in "Commemoration 
Essays on public law & politics for the sixtieth anniversary of Prof. 
Junji Nomura's birth" pp. 479 et seq.， in which he explains that there 
is in France a chain of acts called actes de gouvernement excluded from 
the objects of trial， that why these acts are placed outside the objects 
of trial， that what kind of act is regarded as acte de gouvernement in 
the judicial precedents of that country， and so forth. At that time in 
Japan， however， what is called acte de gouvernement did not arouse 
special interest among the academic circ1es owing to the fact that the 
matters of administrative litigation was restricted to a greater extent 
and that it was a matter of course that the power of administrative 
adjudication could not extend to the act of state of our country corres-
ponding to acte de gouvernement of France. 
Whereas， with the results， followed from the revision of the previous 
Constitution of the Empire of Japan to the present Constitution of Japan， 
that administrative litigation as well as civil and criminal litigations was 
included in judicial function， every case on public law came to be judged 
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by a court of justice without any restriction on the matters of administra-
tive lititgation.1) 
The rule， then， seems to have been set up that act of state in our 
country corresponding to what is called acte de gouvernement in France 
is to be inquired by a court so far as it is contested as a legal problem. 
Accordingly the problem on the so-called acte de gouvernement， left out 
of actual consideration in our state system in the past， has turned to 
be actual one attracting attention of our law circ1es. Writings on it 
have gradually!， come out in papers and works. In course of time， how-
ever， while the question called for the academic interests， a concrete 
problem arose which urged a practical solution in this respect. It was 
the case on the Confirmation of Membership of the House of Represen-
tatives and the c1aim for Annual Payment， 1952， Tokyo District Court 
No. 156 (decision on Oct. 19， 1953)2) and the following appealed case on 
the Confirmation of Membership of the House of Representatives etc.， 
1953， Tokyo High Court NO.2021 (decision on Sept. 22， 1954).3) In this 
case the point disputed as a pre-merits question in both judgements was 
on the ability of a court to inquire whether or not the act of state， the 
dissolution of the House of Representatives， was in conformity with the 
Constitution. The State， the defendant and appellant， maintained that 
a court has no jurisdiction over the matter， while Mr. Gizo Tomabechi， 
the plainti旺 andappellee， held on the contrary. The courts， on the 
other hand， answered in affirmative at both the first and second trials. 
The State dissatisfied with the decision and appealed to the Supreme 
Court， inwhich the case is in pendency at present. The Supreme Court 
is sooner or later to give a decision on the case. 
Thus， al of a sudden， the actual urgency to solve the problem 
has fired the enthusiasm in the academic circ1es for the study on it 
followed one after another not only by the comments on the above 
precedent but by the fundamental studies with the theme of the so-called 
1) See Tatsugoro Isozaki:“The Administrative Law (An Introduction)" pp. 170 et seq 
2) The docket on the aministrative cas巴s，vol. 4， No. 10， pp. 2450 et seq 
3) The docket on the adinistrative cases， vol. 5， No. 9， pp. 2181 et seq. 
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acte de gouvernement itself.4) The Pub1ic Law Society of ]apan has also 
took up acte de gouvernement as one of the subjects to study at its 
fifteenth congress in May， 1955.5) The study was of variety: some 
introduced precedents and doctorins on acte de gouvernement in such 
foreign countries as America， England， France and Germany， some looked 
into the theoretical basis of acte de gouvernement in case that it was 
accepted， some examined. if such acte de gouvernement could be accepted 
in our country and other considered these points at once in an essay. 
Through the works already made public there seems to be comparatively 
many writers who hold the view that acte de gouvernement should be 
accepted also in our country. 
Things having come to sucha pass as the above mentioned， what 
is most important to do today is， 1 think， that as many students as 
possible will give out their views as to whether the so-called acte de 
gouvernement can be accepted under our Constitution. In determining 
the matter of constitutional consequence， the conc1usion， be it yes or no， 
is desired to be reached after heated discussions among many students. 
1 am going to 0妊ermy own views in out1ine in the following chapters. 
I 
In treating the problem as to whether the so-called acte de gouverne-
4) Among those studies the chief works are as follows; Junjiro Yamada， ，‘The dissolution 
of the House of Representatives and acte de gouvernement" (Horitsu-ronso， voL 27， No. 
4)， ，ιActe de gouvernement in the democratic countries" (Horitsu-ronso， voL 27， No. 5，6)， 
"The recent legal theories on acte de gouvernement in France" (Horitsu・ronso，voL 28， 
No. 2，3); Toshiyoshi Miyazawa， Isao Sato， Akira Nakamura and Hajime Kaneko，“The 
problems involved in the decision to invalidate the dissolution of the House of Represen-
tatives" (Jurist， No. 46) ; Kazushi Kojima，“ On the decision of the Tokyo District Court 
to invalidate the dissolution of the House of Representatives" (Jichi-kenkyu， voL 30， 
No. 4) ; Ichiro Ogawa，“ On acte de gouvernement" (Kokka-gakkai-zasshi， voL 68， No.3， 
4，9，10: voL 70， No. 1，2) ; Kiminobu Hashimoto， "The power of jurisdiction and political 
questions" (Hogaku-shimpo， voL 59， No. 9) Shozaburo Ichihara，“The limitation of 
judicial inquiry" (Hitotsubashi-ronso， voL 31， No. 5) ; Akira Nishio， " On acte de gouverne-
ment" (Doshisha-hogaku， No. 33) ; Hiroshi Kaneko， "The study of acte de gouvernement " 
(Kokka-gakkai-zasshi， voL 71， No. 8，11; voL 72， No. 2，9). 
5) Reports at the fifteenth congress of The Pub1ic Law Society of Japan are inserted in 
No. 13 of Koho四kenkyu，and those on acte de gouvernement are as follows; Toshio Irie， 
" Acte de gouv巴rnement"; Junjiro Yamada， "On acte de gouvernement "; Kinuko Kubota， 
"Political questions in the Constitution of America "; Ichiro Ogawa， "The tendency of 
acte de gouvernement in France "; Hiroshi Kaneko， "The trend of comments on acte de 
gouvernement in Germany". 
4 T ATSUGORO ISOZAKI 
ment can be accepted in the light of the Constitution of our country， 
it must be at first clarified what is meant by acte de gouvernement and 
what kind of acts can fal1 into its category， which requires accurate 
studies on the institutions of foreign countries as such where it is accepted. 
On the latter point， however， 1 can do nothing at present but borrow 
the results as they are which have been already made public by other 
writers. Di旺eringin nuance of course， al1of them seem to have almost 
the same way of dealing with it， so that 1 will depend for convenience 
upon the study by Mr. ]ustice Toshio Irie， a judge of the Supreme Court， 
for my further consideration. 
The study of“Acte de gouvernement" by Mr. ]ustice lrie appears 
in the Koho-kenkyu， No. 13， pp. 75 et seq. According to him，“Acte de 
gouvernement is the act which the legal issue arising from it can neither 
be inquired nor judged by a regular court because of its having highly 
political character ぺ (Koho-kenkyu，No. 13， pp. 84-85). He further 
analyzes the definition， and its summary is as fol1ows: (1) Firstly， itis 
an "act of state". An act of state， though it is simply cal1ed so， is
the act of the supreme organs of the executive and the legislature and 
the act of judicature itself is not included in the category. (2) Secondly， 
acte de gouvernement is the act of the executive and the legislature 
which has "highly political character". By highly political character 
here political character is meant in the sense that it is closely connected 
with what the institution of state and its opperation should be. In other 
words， when it is considered to run counter in the end to the principle 
of division of powers under people's sovereignty that judicial power as 
one of the three powers final1y inquires and judges some kind of acts 
done by the other two powers， they are to be called acts of highly 
political character. (3) Thirdly， itis the matter relating to“a legal 
problem ". Acte de gouvernement， but for its highly political character， 
is a case which is to be the object of inquiryand judgement of a court， 
and， therefore， an act to be distinctly beyond the power of a court is 
out of discussion as to whether it is acte de gouvernement or not. (4) 
Fourthly， acte de gouvernement is an act placed outside the inquiry and 
judgement of “a regular court". In those countries where the adminis-
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trative adjudication is included under the function of judicature a regular 
court means an ordinary judicial court， which exercises over the adminis-
trative litigation， too_ The question will naturally be another one， if
the Constitution contains some specific provisions which permit the 
jurisdiction of a judicial court over acte de gouvernement or set up a 
special court so that it may be inquired and judged (ibid.， pp. 85-87). 
As general examples of acte de gouvernement the said Justice indicates 
the following points: (1) The fundamental matters relating to organization 
of the President， the Cabinet and the Diet (inauguration of the President， 
appiontment of the Prime Minister and the members of the Cabinet， and 
examination of qualificaion of and disciplinary measures against the 
Diet members); (2) The fundamental matters relating to management 
of the President， the Cabinet and the Diet (the 0伍cialacts of the Presi-
dent under the Constitution; organization， business， the quorum and the 
method of resolutions of the Cabinet council; business， the number 
of the members and the method of resolution of the both Houses of the 
Diet); (3) The matters relating to the reciprocal negotiations among 
the President， the Cabinet and the Diet (convocation and dissolution of 
the Diet; presentation， amendment and withdrawal of legislative and 
other bills at the Diet); (4) The matters of fatal consequence to a 
nation as a whole (diplomacy， state of siege and war etc.) (ibid. p. 93) 
. 1 wil1 henceforth call this list“List A of Mr. J ustice lrie". 
He further presents the following list corresponding to the above 
one， in case of taking the position of accepting acte de gouvernement 
under our Constitution: (1) The fundamental matters relating to orga-
nization of the Cabinet and the Diet (appointment of the Prime Minister， 
appointmen~ and dismissal of other ministers， examination of quali色cation
of and disciplinary measures against the Diet members， selection of the 
president， the vice-president and heads of the standing committees at 
both Houses) ; (2) The fundamental matters relating to management 
of the Cabinet and the Diet (organization of the Cabinet， business and 
method of decision of the Cabinet council， the advice and approval 
of the Cabinet for the Emperor， designation of the interim deputy 
for the Prime Minister and the competent minister; the quorum， business 
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and method of resolution at the plenary session of both Houses of the 
Diet; the quorum， business and method of resolution at the committees 
of both Houses of the Diet); (3) The matters relating to recipr10cal 
negotiations between the Cabinet and the Diet (convocation of the Diet， 
dissolution of the House of Representatives; presentation， amendment 
and withdrawal of legislative and other bi1ls at the Diet); (4) The 
matters of fatal consequence to the nation as a whole (diplomacy， the 
order for defence moving， the order for moving for the public peace， 
declaration of the state of emergency) (ibid.， pp. 102-105)ー・・・・ 1 will 
henceforth cal this list “List B of Mr. J ustice lrie". 
II 
Whether the so-called acte de gouvernement can be accepted in our 
country depends entirely upon how the question is answered that whe-
ther or not the legal problem deriving from the unconstitutionality of 
such acts of state as are enumerated on the above List B of Mr. Justice 
Irie is regarded to be inquired and determined at a court in spite of its 
having highly political character. It should be answered only under the 
provisions of the Constitution of our country. 
Of the provisions of our Constitution those directly connected with 
the above question are pe1'haps both Article 98， paragraph 1 and Artic1e 
81. 
( i ) 
In the first place， Article 98， paragraph 1 stipulates，“This Contitution 
shall be the sup1'eme law of the nation and no law， ordinance， impe1'ial 
1'esc1'ipt or othe1' act of gove1'nment， 01' part the1'eof， contrary to the 
provisions he1'eof， shall have legal force or validity". It can not be 
otherwise in theory that Constitution， so fa1' as it is the Constitution of 
a nation， isthe sup1'eme law of the nation and that no law， o1'dinance 
01' other act of government contra1'y to it have validity. Furthermore， 
our Constitution does not leave the axiomatical matter only to the theory 
but creates it as a constitutional norm and grants the constitutional 
fo1'ce and e百ectto the theory. That is because law， ordinance or other 
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act of government contrary to the Constitution may possibly be trans-
acted as valid if there is no other ground than that they have no vali-
dity in theory， and the supremacy of the Constitution can not help being 
violated to that extent. The practical inability of holding the supremacy 
on the part of the Constitution may produce the consequences that legal 
order of a nation would be fundamentally corrupt， that normal adminis-
tration of state a旺airs.would not be expected and that at last it would 
lead a nation to its catastrophe and farther reduce the people to the 
direct distress. This we have deeply experienced in the immediate past. 
On the supremacy of the Constitution the positive e妊ectshould be bes-
towed and maintained lest we should purchase such bitter experience 
again. With this end in view Artic1e 98， paragraph 1 was laid down. 
This provision should never be overlooked in the manner that it is no 
more than the mere expression of the self-evident fact. 
The act invalid is limited to one contrary to the provisions of the 
Constitution. An act of state which is not so regarded offers no problem 
under this artic1e. For instance， in case a certain organ of the State 
could perform a certain act at its own discretion under the Constitution， 
no problem would occur as to the unconstitutionality of the act since 
there is no provision in the Constitution to direct the organ how to carry 
it out. Such kind of act has， from the beginning， nothing to do with 
this article. What is made invalid by this artic1e isrestricted to an act 
of the State contrary to the provisions of the Constitution. 
ln the second place， an act invalid on account of its departure from 
the provisions is to be either law， ordinance， imperial rescript or other 
act of government. It means every act of government. It does not 
matter whether it is legislative， judicial or administrative act. From 
the view point of the organ which carries it out it includes every act 
done by the Emperor， the Diet， each House， courts and the Cabinet， 
respectively or conjointly with more than two organs. Every act of 
state enumerated on the List B of Mr. Justice lrie belongs to the acts 
of government stipulated in this article. lt is hardly possible to deny 
it on account of its having highly political character. It is possible only 
when the Constitution signifies the intent in its own provisions. If， 
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however， such an exception could be admitted， this provision would be 
almost mutilated. Presumably the main purpose of this provision which 
stipulates invalidity of an act of government contrary to the provisions 
of the Constitution is to make the supreme organs of the three powers 
unable to do unconstitutional act. It is of no doubt that almost al 
the acts of the supreme organs of the three powers have， more or less， 
highly political character. If they were， in spite of their unconstitu-
tionality， admitted to have validity because of their highly political 
character， then the natural consequence would follow that the provision 
saying，“no law， ordinance， imperial rescript or other act of government， 
or part thereof， contrary to the provisions of the Constitution， shall 
have legal force or validity" would degenerate into mere formality and 
every act of government of the utmost importance would be， in fact， 
dea1t with as valid in spite of its unconstitutionality. Since the conse-
quence is c1early inconsistent with this provision， such a particular case 
could not be and in fact is not stipulated in the Constitution. Therefore， 
even the acts of the state on the List B of Mr. Justice lrie will have 
no legal force and validity in the light of this provision so far as they 
belong to the acts of government under this provision and are contrary 
to the provisions of the Constitution. 
Attention must be paied to that provision saying “no law..... .shall 
have legal force or validity". An act of government by an organ of 
the State contrary to the constitutional provisions is to be ipso facto 
invalid and never to be declared null and void by other organ of the 
State. It is not worth consideration at al that an organ of the State， 
with regard to the alleged invalidity of an unconstitutional act of gove-
rnment of other organ， would disregard or overrule the latter's compe-
tence. The question is simply whether the act of government by the 
organ of the State is ever unconstitutional and whether it is possible to 
leave its determination to the other organ of the State. It is not set 
down in this provision but in 'Artic1e 81. 
( i) 
As was already considered， no act of government contrary to the 
provisions of the Constitution has legal force or validity， but it is so 
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only when its unconstitutionality is determined. It is， however， itself 
a di伍cultproblem to determine the constitutionality of an act of gove-
rnment， which may hardly be solved in many cases if the solution is 
left to the parties contesting each other. Consequently it creates a 
necessity for some organ of the State which solves it authentically. 
Our Constitution assignes a court for the organ of the State responsible 
for it. Article 81 reads，“The Supreme Court is the court of last resort 
with power to determine the constitutionality of any law， order， regula-
tion or 0伍cialact ". 
Each organ of the three powers has， of course， tentative power to 
interpret the provisions of the Constitution and carries out its individual 
acts regarded as constitutional according to its own interpretation. It 
goes without saying that the act would be valid as conformable to the 
Constitution if there were no contestation as to its constitutionality. 
But so far as the constitutionality of an act is once contested according 
to the recognized 1ine， neither the Diet nor the Cabinet can force its 
own interpretation or decision on the other organ， no matter how firmly 
they may be co凶 dentof the constitutionality of the act done. In other 
words， the Diet or the Cabinet has no authentic power to determine the 
constitutionality of the act. This power is possessed by and only by a 
court. A court here means a regular court designed in the Constitution 
for the organ in charge of judicature. It may be thought of to set up 
such courts besides a regular court of justice as the Courts of Consti-
tutional or Administrative Litigation and to give them the above-menti-
oned power， but the present. Constitution confers the power upon a 
regular court without admitting the specific courts as was just mentioned. 
What a court determines is nothing but the point of constitutionality 
of the act at issue. If the act was constitutional， then the court would 
so determine， and vice versa. It can never exert an influence upon the 
effect of the act. When the act is determined to be constitutional， it is 
valid. It is so not because the court makes it valid but because it is 
the constitutional e百ectderived directly from the determination of the 
constitutionality of the act. When the act is determined to be uncons-
situtional it is invalid. It is so not because the court makes it invalid 
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but because it is the constitutional effect derived directly from the 
determination of its unconstitutionality. It should not be taken for in 
the manner that the court is able to determine for itself not only the 
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of an act but also its validity or 
invalidity. 
As to the very determination of the constitutionality of an act of 
government， however， the Constitution confers the power exc1usively 
upon a court， and therefore the decision of the court is so far authentic， 
to which both the Diet and the Cabinet should be obedient. Even if the 
Diet and the Cabinet regard the act as constitutional， they can not 
neglect but obey the determination of its unconstitutionality so far as 
the court has so determined. In this respect， itmay be properly said 
that the court is predominant over the Diet or the Cabinet. This is， 
however， the position which is expressly conferred to the court by the 
Constitution and not the position which the court won for itself by 
overwhelming the other two organs. If one would condemn the court 
in its predominant position， the critic would be walking altogether in the 
wrong direction and the condemnation should rather be directed to the 
Constitution itself which provided such division of powers. 
What the court determines， at first， ison the legal issue as to whe-
ther an act of government conforms to the Constitution and is not on 
other questions as to whether it is suitable from the viewpoint of 
politics or public good. There is not a shadow of doubt about it in the 
light of the express provision of Artic1e 81 which reads， " •••to determine 
the constitutionality . "， and it is also c1ear from the fact that the 
court is the judicial organ with its proper function of maintaining law 
under the Constitution. In other words the court is considered， in the 
Constitution， most suitable as an organ to determine the constitutionality 
of an act of government. If the court had been designed in the Cons-
titution to determine the issue of an act of government in regard to 
politics or public good， itmust have assumed quite an unsuitable fun-
ction， but in fact such unreasonableness is not provided in the Constitu' 
tion. It is certain， on the other hand， that if the court determined the 
unconstitutionality of an act of government the act would be of no 
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validity and the consequence would be brought about that the act concer-
ned done by other organ as the political decision would end in fiasco. 
From this fact， however， one should not misunderstand it in the way that 
the above determination of the court wi1 in自uenceupon the political 
decision of other organ. First of al， the above consequence in such a 
case is produced not because the court made the decision which would 
in丑uenceupon the decision of other organ， but because it is the legal 
effect which is directly provided in the Constitution and which is derived 
from a legal fact that the court determines the unconstitutionality of 
the act. The reason why the political decision of other organ comes to 
naught lies in the fact that it is the legal e妊ectthat the determination 
of the legal issue as to the constitutionality of the act depends at first 
hand upon the provisions of the Constitution. The court does not make 
it so. Secondly， we should not make a wrong estimation of the diffe-
rence of importance between the legal and political issues in this case. 
Other organs are able to make political decisions according to what is 
recognized by the Constitution. Political decisions wil1 be indeed of 
both necessity and importance， but such necessary and important deci-
sion can be made only through the recognition of the Constitution， 
without which there is no ground forit to be made. Political decisions， 
therefore， could be appraised only on the assumption that it is made in 
ccinformity with the Constitution. Accordingly it is a natural consequne-
ce， in case of its being unconstitutionally made， that the Constitution 
makes it invalid and allows no room for its political appraisal. It is 
only the legal problem as to the constitutionality of the act that the 
court touches here and if the court detemined it in the negative， the 
political appraisal as to the act would never be made and the act 
would come to naught. It is so， however， not because the political 
significance of the act is neglected by the court but because it accords 
with the provisions of the Constitution. 
The court determines the constitutionality of any law， order， regula-
tion or 0自cialact. First， the act of government on which the court 
makes inquiry and decision is required to be such kind of acts as the 
court can detemine their constitutionality. As was mentioned above， 
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such an act as not to bring the problem of unconstitutionality is exc1u-
ded as a matter of course from the acts 1'eferred to in this a1'tic1e， since 
there is no p1'ovision to regulate it in the Constitution. Instead， the 
court can inquire and dete1'mine eve1'y act as to which its constituti帽
onality can be determined at all. Since it is p1'ovided in Artic1e 98， 
paragraph 1 that no act of government contrary to the p1'ovision of the 
Constitution shall have legal force or validity， the constitutionality of 
eve1'y act of government is， ifdoubtful， requi1'ed to be inquired or dete-
1'mined. This being carried out by the court acco1'ding to A1'tic1e 81， 
the court should be able to dete1'mine the constitutionality of every act 
of government. This is why A1'ticle 81 provides， "any law， o1'der， 
regulation 01' 0伍cialact" The acts of state on the List B of Mr. Justice 
Irie a1'e of course inc1uded in“any act" in this artic1e. No matter 
how highly political character these acts of government may possess， 
their constitutionalityare necessarily determined by the court so far as 
theyare not excluded from the Constitution itself. 
The court has the power to determine the constitutionality of eve1'y 
act of government. To put it in another way， the court has the duties 
of the above dete1'mination. If the court should 1'eject the determination 
without having constitutional g1'ound， itwould itself venture to violate 
the Constitution by neglecting its duties. Consequently， since the 
Constitution does not p1'ovide the exceptional case that constitutionality 
of the act is not inqui1'ed and dete1'mined on account of its highly 
political characte1'， the court can and should， now that it comes into 
question， inquire and determine the constitutionality of the act， however 
highly political cha1'acte1' it may have， and the1'efo1'e， that of the act of 
state on the List B of Mr. Justice lrie. 
IV 
As has been conside1'ed， itcomes to be c1ear after making a careful 
examination of both Artic1e 98， parag1'aph 1 and A1'tic1e 81 that the 
court can inqui1'e and determine the constitutionality， wheneve1' it is 
contested， of the act of state unde1' our Constitution， howeve1' highly 
political cha1'acte1' it may possess. It must be conc1uded， the1'efo1'e， 
that the so-salled acte de gouvernement can nοt be accepted unde1' our 
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Constitution. A chain of acts of state on the List B of Mr. Justice 
Irie would be， as he also admits， nothing but actes de gouvernement if 
they were accepted in this country， but on the contrary if they were 
not accepted here， these acts of state would never be actes de gouverne-
ment and would， of course， be object of inquiry and determination of 
the court. 
There are some writers who maintain that， while they admit that 
the above interpretation would be unavoidable if the provisions of 
Article 48， paragraph 1 and Article 81 should be taken literally， there 
can be another way of interpretation， namely teleological one， according 
to which acte de gouvernement can be， on the contrary to the above 
interpretation， admitted in our country.l) 
On the interpretation of the Constitution just as that of other laws 
it is often argued which interpretation should be given， literal or teleolo-
gical. 1 do not take so formal a view of the matter as it should depend 
by al means upon either of the two. What is more important is to 
grasp the true purpose and spirit of the Constitution. Since the purpose 
and spirit of the Constitution are generally considered to be most ade-
quately expressed through the wording of the provisions， itseems to 
cause no inconvenience to interpret the provisions of the Constitution 
just as their wording expresses. If this way of interpretation could be 
called literal interpretation it would be the principle as the interpre-
tation of the Constitution. But， as the case may be， itmay sometimes 
happen that the purpose and spirit of the provisions are considered 
impossible to be grasped if it was taken just as they were expressed in 
their wording. In such a case we have to understand the purpose of 
the provision， which will be shown in the wording of the provision 
concerned， by considering at the same time the relevant provisions or 
the Constitution as a whole. If this way of interpretation could be 
called teleological interpretation， itwould be no more than supplemental 
as the interpretation of the Constitution; Literal interpretation， though 
1) They are， for instance， Mr. Justice Irie (Koho-kenkyu， No. 13， pp. 100.101)， Prof 
Ogawa (Kokka-gakkai-zasshi， vol. 70. No. 1， 2， pp. 90-92)， Assistant Prof. Kaneko (Kokka-
gakkai-zasshi， vol. 72. No. 9， pp. 2仏33)，etc. 
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it is cal1ed literal， never means only to interpret the wording of pro-
visions mechanical1y without considering the purpose of the Constitution. 
Its rationality comes from the consideration that to take the wording 
of the provision as it is accords exactly with its purpose. In this sense 
not only the so…called teleological interpretation but also literal one is 
teleological. 
Be the matter as it may， according to those who fol1ow the so-
called teleological interpretation， acte de gouvernement， contrary to my 
view， can be accepted in our country， and various explanations are 
made. 1 have further， however， to criticize the explanations of the 
opponents. But 1 will reserve it for another occasion. 
P.s. 
As to the interpretation of Artic1e 81 of the Constitution many 
points are in controversy and views are not necessarily in accord with. 
Here 1 took up this provision， without referring to these points disputed， 
to the extent that it is necessary to c1ear whether the so-cal1ed acte 
de gouvernement can be accepted or not. 
